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In this paper, we examine formally Keynes’ idea that higher order beliefs can drive
a wedge between an asset price and its fundamental value based on expected future
payo￿s. In a dynamic noisy rational expectations model, higher order expectations
add an additional term, which we call the higher order wedge, to a standard asset
pricing equation. Consistent with Keynes’ reasoning we show that investment
decisions are based not just on expected future payo￿s, but also on anticipated
future expectational errors made by the market. The latter are captured by the
higher order wedge. We show that the expectation of future expectational errors by
the market is perfectly rational when investors have both noisy public and private
information. The main e￿ect of this additional asset pricing term is to disconnect
the price from the present value of future payo￿s. We show that this e￿ect can be
quantitativelysigni￿cant.
Keywords: Beauty contest, Heterogeneous information
JEL Classification: G12, G14, D821 Introduction
In his General Theory, Keynes (1936) devotes signi￿cant attention to factors that
can drive a wedge between an asset price and its fundamental value based on ex-
pected future payo￿s.1 He emphasizes in particular two factors, mass psychology
and higher order opinions. Although market psychology had largely been neglected
for decades, it is now receiving signi￿cant attention in the growing ￿eld of behav-
ioral ￿nance.2 On the other hand, the impact of higher order expectations on the
equilibrium asset price has received little attention and is not well understood.
Higher order expectations refer to expectations that investors form of other
investors’ expectations of an asset’s subsequent payo￿s. They should naturally play
an important role in asset markets where investors have heterogenous information.
In the words of Keynes, investors \are concerned, not with what an investment is
really worth to a man who buys it for keeps, but with what the market will value
it at ... three months or a year hence". In a well-known paragraph he compares
asset markets to a beauty contest, where contestants have to pick the faces that
other competitors ￿nd the most beautiful. Keynes argues that third and higher
order expectations matter as well: \We have reached the third degree where we
devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average
opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, ￿fth and
higher degrees."
In this paper, we formalize Keynes’ ideas on the role of higher order expecta-
tions and investigate the implications for the equilibrium asset price. As antici-
pated by Keynes, we show that higher order expectations create a wedge between
the equilibrium price and the expected value of future payo￿s. More precisely, in
standard asset pricing models the price depends on expected payo￿s and discount
rates. We show that a third determinant is added that depends on the di￿erence
between higher order and ￿rst order expectations of future payo￿s and risk premia.
The main objective of the paper is to understand what determines this wedge cre-
ated by higher order expectations and what its implications are for the equilibrium
asset price.
Our approach towards analyzing the \higher order wedge" is twofold. We ￿rst
1See Chapter 12, section 5.
2See Barberis and Thaler (2003) and Hirshleifer (2001) for surveys of the ￿eld.
1analyze what determines the higher order wedge in a dynamic asset pricing model
with a general information and payo￿ structure. We also consider the implications
of the wedge for the equilibrium price in this general context. Second, we examine
two models with speci￿c information and payo￿ structures, using the insights from
the general analysis. The ￿rst model is of a ￿nite-lived asset with one terminal
payo￿, which is widely studied in ￿nance. The second model is of an in￿nitely-
lived asset with continuous payo￿s and a constant information ￿ow, leading to a
time-invariant equilibrium price function. These two models are also used to show
that higher order expectations can have signi￿cant quantitative implications for
the equilibrium price.
A basic feature of the higher order wedge is that it depends on expectational
errors of future payo￿s that the average investor expects the market to make next
period. This is in line with Keynes’ reasoning discussed above. If investors expect
that the market will value the asset too high next period, they will buy the asset,
pushing up its price. This is captured by the higher order wedge, which is positive
when investors systematically expect other investors to value the asset too high in
future periods.
We show that it is perfectly rational for investors to expect that next period’s
market expectation of future payo￿s is too high or too low. Investors expect
the market to make expectational errors to the extent that they expect average
private signals to di￿er from their own. Public information plays a key role here.
When an investor receives private information that is less favorable than public
information, he concludes that his private signal is weak and expects others to
have more favorable private information. Consequently, when the average private
signal is weaker than public information, the majority of investors expect others
to have more favorable private signals than their own. If private signals today are
still informative tomorrow, the majority of investors then expect the outlook of
the market to be too favorable tomorrow. Investors buy the asset in anticipation
of this, pushing up the price. Thus, it is the combination of both noisy public and
private information that makes it rational for investors to expect the market to
make expectational errors.
We ￿nd that one of the key implications of the higher order wedge is that it
disconnects the price from the present value of future payo￿s. Overly favorable
public signals generally lead to both an overestimation of the present value of future
2payo￿s and an overestimate of average private signals about those future payo￿s.
The latter leads to a positive higher order wedge, which therefore ampli￿es the
impact on the asset price of expectational errors about future payo￿s. By giving
more weight to expectational errors the higher order wedge reduces the correlation
between the equilibrium price and future payo￿s.
Although the impact of higher order expectations has not been explicitly ana-
lyzed yet in a dynamic asset pricing model, there is a signi￿cant literature dealing
with higher order expectations. We review some of this literature in the next sec-
tion and argue that there has been some confusion about the role of higher order
expectations. We also make clear how our paper relates to the literature. What
is noteworthy about models with higher order expectations is that they can be
solved without making these expectations explicit. However, this does not mean
that these expectations do not matter for the equilibrium price. It is the purpose
of this paper to analyze them explicitly and to show in what way they matter.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 3 we develop a sim-
ple asset price equation that relates the price to ￿rst and higher order expectations
of future dividends and risk premia. We show that the equilibrium price is driven
by three factors: expected payo￿s, current and expected future risk premia and
the di￿erence between higher order and ￿rst order expectations of future payo￿s
and risk premia. In section 4 we analyze the determinants of the higher order
wedge. We ￿rst show that it can be written in the form of expectations of fu-
ture expectational errors. We then show that expectations of future expectational
errors themselves depend on expectational errors about the mean set of private
signals. Finally, we show that these expectational errors result from noisy public
information about the mean set of private signals. In section 5 we explain why the
wedge weakens the correlation between the asset price and future payo￿s. This is
made more precise in sections 6 and 7, which adopt speci￿c payo￿ and information
structures. In section 6 we consider a ￿nitely-lived asset with only one payo￿, while
in section 7 we study an in￿nitely-lived asset with continuous payo￿s. Section 8
concludes.
32 Related Literature
While higher-order beliefs have been studied in a wide range of contexts, two fea-
tures make them of special interest in the context of ￿nancial markets. First,
in ￿nancial markets the price today depends on the price tomorrow, so that in-
vestors naturally need to form expectations of future market expectations. This
dynamic perspective di￿ers from the analysis of ’static’ higher order expectations,
i.e., expectations of expectations within a period. This is the case when agents in-
teract strategically, e.g., as in Morris and Shin (2002), Woodford (2003) or Amato
and Shin (2003).3 We abstract from strategic interactions by assuming atomistic
investors. Second, in ￿nancial markets the price provides a mechanism through
which idiosyncratic information is aggregated. In forming expectations of other
investors’ expectations, special attention is paid to the asset price as it is infor-
mative about the private information of others. This additional feature is often
not present in the analysis of games with incomplete information, e.g., in global
games.
We will show that equilibrium asset prices depend on a dynamic form of higher
order expectations. It depends on the average expectation at time t of the dividend
at t + 1, the average expectation at t of the average expectation at t + 1 of the
dividend at t + 2, and so on. This is the ￿rst paper to explicitly solve for the
equilibrium price as a function of higher order expectations of all future payo￿s.
It allows us to explicitly analyze the implications of higher order expectations
for the equilibrium price. While dynamic asset price models with higher order
expectations have been studied in several papers, the implications of the models
are generally analyzed without any reference to higher order expectations. This
can be done because these models can be solved using a reduced form where higher
order expectations are not explicit. This was ￿rst shown by Townsend (1983) in
the context of a dynamic business cycle model that features dynamic higher order
expectations.4
3Hellwig (2003) characterizes explicitly higher order expectations in the model proposed by
Woodford (2003). It is therefore related in spirit to our approach.
4The general approach is the method of undetermined coe￿cients. In the context of asset
pricing one ￿rst assumes some equilibrium asset price as a linear function of current and past
innovations. Investors make decisions based on this conjectured price equation. The resulting
equilibrium price equation is then equated to the conjectured one in order to solve for the
4Most of the literature on asset pricing and higher order expectations considers
a special model where an asset has only one payo￿ at a terminal date.5 Investors
receive private information on the ￿nal payo￿ either at an initial date or every
period. They trade every period and progressively learn about the ￿nal payo￿
by observing the price. Such a model is studied in particular by He and Wang
(1995), Vives (1995), Foster and Viswanathan (1996), Brennan and Cao (1997),
and Allen, Morris, and Shin (2003).6 Several interesting insights have been drawn
by previous authors,7 but only Allen et. al. (2003) explicitly analyze the role of
higher order expectations for the equilibrium price.
He and Wang (1995) and Foster and Viswanathan (1996) show that higher order
expectations can be reduced to ￿rst order expectations. However, the higher order
expectations that they refer to do not in￿uence the equilibrium asset price. They
focus on static higher order expectations (the average expectation at time t of the
average expectation at time t) instead of the dynamic higher order expectations
discussed above that the equilibrium price depends on. Even though these authors
do not consider the relevant higher order expectations, they are correct in arguing
that higher order expectations can be reduced to ￿rst order expectations. In this
paper we show that the higher order wedge depends on the average ￿rst order
expectational error about the mean set of private signals. It is important to stress
though that the ability to reduce higher order to ￿rst order expectations does not
imply that they do not matter. The wedge created by higher order expectations
is an additional determinant of the asset price, separate from expected dividends
and risk premia, and can be quantitatively very large.8
coe￿cients.
5See Brunnermeier (2001) for a nice survey of the literature. There are a few papers that
work with somewhat alternative models, e.g., Biais and Bossaerts (1998).
6Foster and Viswanathan (1996) consider a model with strategic trading, while the other
papers consider competitive investors.
7Among the issues analyzed are trading volume and intensity, market depth and liquidity, the
informativeness of prices, as well as important aspects of the solution procedure.
8He and Wang (1995) and Foster and Viswanathan (1996) argue that the ability to reduce
higher order to ￿rst order expectations helps solve the model since the in￿nite space of mean
beliefs that Townsend (1983) alluded to is reduced to a space of only ￿rst order beliefs. However,
the method of undetermined coe￿cients used by Townsend to solve the model does not make any
reference to the space of mean beliefs and the solution methods in these two papers also make
no use of the fact that higher order expectations can be reduced to ￿rst order expectations.
5Allen et. al. (2003) focus more closely on the role of higher order expectations
in the terminal payo￿ model. They do not analyze the higher order wedge, but
compare the equilibrium price function over time. The farther we are from the
terminal date, the higher the order of expectations. They ￿nd that more weight is
given to public information the higher the order of expectations. A limitation of
that approach is that the equilibrium price function can also change over time due
to an expanding information set. In this paper we focus on the higher order wedge
since it allows us to more precisely identify the role of higher order expectations.
We also develop the role of noisy public information in a more general environment.
We show that it leads to expectational errors about the mean set of private signals,
which contributes to disconnecting the price from future payo￿s.
While the terminal payo￿ model is technically convenient, it is not very realistic.
A few papers have analyzed asset pricing models with higher order expectations
in a more realistic dynamic environment with an in￿nitely-lived asset yielding
dividends each period and with a constant ￿ow of information. Such models lead to
time-independent second order moments and are more in the tradition of stochastic
dynamic macroeconomic models. Higher order expectations in an in￿nite horizon
framework were indeed ￿rst analyzed in macroeconomics, in the business cycle
model of Townsend (1983). The ￿rst paper in ￿nance to analyze such a model
is Singleton (1987). He focuses on the time series properties of the equilibrium
price, without considering the role of higher order expectations. In Bacchetta
and van Wincoop (2003), we solve an in￿nite horizon model of exchange rate
determination in which higher order expectations arise. Using the results from
the present paper, we show that higher order expectations can help contribute to
the puzzling disconnect between the exchange rate and observed macroeconomic
aggregates.
3 A Simple Asset Pricing Equation
In this section we derive a simple asset price equation that relates the asset price
to higher order expectations of future payo￿s. We adopt a share economy that
is standard in the noisy rational expectations literature and allows for an exact
solution without using linearization methods. The basic assumptions are: i) con-
stant absolute risk aversion; ii) a normally distributed excess return; iii) a constant
6risk-free interest rate; iv) a share economy with a stochastic supply of shares; v)
investors invest for one period only (overlapping-generations of two-period lived
investors); vi) a competitive market with a continuum of investors on the interval
[0;1].
Investors allocate optimally their wealth between a risky stock and a safe asset.
Let Pt be the ex-dividend share price, Dt the dividend, and R the constant gross
interest rate. The dollar excess return on one share is Qt+1 = Pt+1 + Dt+1 ￿ RPt.
This leads to the standard asset demand equation
x
i
t =
Ei
t(Pt+1 + Dt+1) ￿ RPt
￿￿2
t
(1)
where ￿ is the rate of absolute risk aversion and ￿2
t is the conditional variance of
next period’s excess return.
The per capita random supply of shares is Xt, so that the equilibrium price
Pt follows from the market clearing condition
R 1
0 xi
tdi = Xt. As usual, we assume
that average random variables are equal to their expected values9 and we de￿ne
the average or market expectation as Et =
R 1
0 Ei
tdi. If we de￿ne the risk premium
term as ￿t = ￿￿2
tXt=R, the market clearing condition gives:
Pt =
1
R
Et(Pt+1 + Dt+1) ￿ ￿t: (2)
To compute the equilibrium price, we need to integrate (2) forward. In typi-
cal asset pricing formulas, this is done by applying the law of iterated expecta-
tions. While this law always holds for individual expectations, it may not hold for
market expectations when investors have di￿erent information sets. For example,
EtEt+1Dt+2 6= EtDt+2.10 Thus, we de￿ne the average expectation of order k as
E
k
t = EtEt+1:::Et+k￿1 (3)
for k > 1. Moreover, E
0
tx = x, E
1
tx = Etx. The equilibrium price is then (ruling
out bubbles):
Pt =
1 X
s=1
1
RsE
s
tDt+s ￿
1 X
s=1
1
RsE
s
t￿t+s ￿ ￿t (4)
9See Admati (1985) for a discussion.
10See also Allen, Morris, and Shin (2003) for a nice illustration.
7The stock price is equal to the present discounted value of expected dividends
minus risk premia. The di￿erence with a standard asset pricing equation is that
￿rst order expectations are replaced by higher order expectations. A dividend
accruing s periods ahead has an expectation of order s. For example, if s = 2,
we need to compute the market expectation at time t of the market expectation
at t + 1 of Dt+2 rather than the ￿rst-order expectation of Dt+2. This implies that
investors have to predict the future market expectation of the dividend rather than
the dividend itself. This is the ’beauty contest’ phenomenon described by Keynes.
Moreover, with an in￿nite horizon, the order of expectation can obviously go to
in￿nity.
To examine the impact of higher order expectations on asset prices, we look at
di￿erences between ￿rst and higher order expectations. This higher order wedge
is de￿ned as
￿t =
1 X
s=2
1
Rs
h
E
s
tDt+s ￿ EtDt+s
i
￿
1 X
s=2
1
Rs
h
E
s
t￿t+s ￿ Et￿t+s
i
(5)
It depends on the present value of deviations between higher order and ￿rst order
expectations of dividends minus risk premia. The higher order wedge ￿t adds a
third element to the standard asset pricing equation:
Pt =
1 X
s=1
1
RsEtDt+s ￿
  1 X
s=1
1
RsEt￿t+s + ￿t
!
+ ￿t (6)
The ￿rst term is associated with expected payo￿s; the second term captures current
and expected future risk premia (a￿ecting discount rates); the last term is the
higher order wedge.
We will de￿ne the present value of dividends minus risk premia at t as PVt =
P1
s=1
1
Rs(Dt+s ￿ ￿t+s), which allows us to also write the asset price as
Pt = EtPVt ￿ ￿t + ￿t; (7)
which will be used below.
4 The Higher Order Wedge
In this section, we examine the determinants of the additional term in the asset
pricing equation under a general information structure. First, we show that the
8higher order wedge is determined by ￿rst and higher order expectations of future
expectational errors. For example, investors at time t need to estimate the market
expectation at t + 1 of the market estimation mistake at t + 2 about the present
value of dividends. Second, we show how the expectation of future expectational
errors, and thus the wedge, is proportional to the ￿rst order expectational error
about average private signals. Third, we examine the conditions under which the
wedge exists and under which it is largest. We show that the presence of public
information plays a crucial role and that the wedge is largest for intermediate
degrees of the quality of private information.
For expositional purposes only, we will assume that the second term in (5) is
zero, so that the higher order wedge is only associated with the di￿erence between
higher and ￿rst order expectations of dividends. This will for example be the
case when there is only public information about future risk premia. We want to
emphasize though that the results in this section are general. Everything we say
below holds for the general case where higher order expectations of both future
dividends and risk premia di￿er from ￿rst order expectations. One simply needs
to replace the word \dividend" by \dividend minus risk-premium" in what follows.
4.1 Expectations of Future Expectational Errors
We ￿rst show that the di￿erence between higher and ￿rst order expectations in
(5) can be written in terms of expectations of market expectational errors. This
has two advantages. First, it makes concrete the conjecture by Keynes (1936)
that investors do not just make decisions based on their own perception of the
\prospective yield" (expected future dividends), but worry about market expecta-
tions. Second, it allows us to adopt an iterative procedure in section 4.3 to convert
the wedge into an expression that depends on ￿rst order expectational errors about
average private signals.
First consider s = 2. The di￿erence between the second and ￿rst order expec-
tation is equal to the average expectation at time t of the average expectational
error at t + 1 about Dt+2:
E
2
tDt+2 ￿ EtDt+2 = Et(Et+1Dt+2 ￿ Dt+2)
The intuition behind this term is as follows. Investment decisions at time t are
based on the expected price at t+1. This price will re￿ect the market expectation of
9subsequent dividends. An investor at time t therefore makes investment decisions
not just based on what he believes the dividend at t+2 to be, but also on whether
he believes the market to make an expectational error at t+1 about the dividend
at t+2. When investors have common information, they expect no future market
expectational errors. But as we show below, this is no longer the case when
information is heterogeneous.
Next consider s = 3. The di￿erence between the third and ￿rst order expec-
tation is equal to the di￿erence between the ￿rst and second order expectation
plus the di￿erence between the second and third order expectation. This can be
written as the average expectation at t of the average expectational error at t + 1
plus the second order expectation at t of the average expectational error at t + 2:
E
3
tDt+3 ￿ EtDt+3 = Et(Et+1Dt+3 ￿ Dt+3) + E
2
t(Et+2Dt+3 ￿ Dt+3)
The last term can be understood as follows. Just as the price at time t depends on
expected average expectational error at t+1, so does the price at t+1 depend on
expected average expectational error at t+2. The expected return from t to t+1
then depends on the expectation at time t of the market’s expectation at t + 1 of
the market’s expectational error at t + 2. In other words, investment decisions at
time t depend on the second order expectation at t of the market’s expectational
error at t + 2.
Proceeding along this line for expectations of even higher order, we can rewrite
(5) as follows:11
￿t =
1 X
s=1
1
Rs+1E
s
t(Et+sPVt+s ￿ PVt+s) (8)
The higher order wedge therefore depends on ￿rst and higher order expectations
of future expectational errors of the subsequent present value of dividends: the
market expectation at t of the market’s expectational error at t + 1 of PVt+1, the
second order expectation at t of the expectational error at t + 2 of PVt+2, and so
on. Investors make decisions not just based on what they expect future dividends
to be, but also on what they expect the market’s expectational error next period
to be about those future dividends, and what they expect next period’s market
11For each s rewrite the di￿erence between the s-order and ￿rst order expectation as E
s
tDt+s￿
￿ EtDt+s = (E
2
tDt+s ￿ EtDt+s) + (E
3
tDt+s ￿ E
2
tDt+s) + ::: + (E
s
tDt+s ￿ E
s￿1
t Dt+s).
10expectation of the expectational error in the subsequent period to be. In the rest
of our analysis we will use (8) instead of (5) to interpret the wedge.
4.2 A General Information Structure
In order to describe what determines the expectations of future expectational er-
rors, as expressed in (8), we need to be somewhat more precise about the infor-
mation structure. Investors have both public and private information. At time
t, investor i has a vector Wi
t of private signals and a vector Zt of public signals.
These are signals obtained at time t and earlier that remain informative at t about
the present value of future dividends. We assume these vectors are ￿nite. Average
private signals are denoted Wt. We make three assumptions about the information
structure.
Assumption 1 The vectors Wi
t, Zt, Wt and PVt have the same joint normal
distribution for all investors i.
In general, some elements of the vector Zt are endogenous, but normality typically
holds in linear models.
The two other assumptions relate to the timing of private signals. It is useful
to consider subsets of the vector of private signals. Let vi
t be the set of new signals
obtained at time t; Vi
t￿1 the set of private signals obtained at t ￿ 1 and earlier
that remain informative at time t about future dividends; and wi
t the set of signals
informative at t, that are no longer informative at t+1 about the present value of
future dividends. A private signal is informative about the present value when it
a￿ects the expectation of the present value conditional on all other information.12
As before, the vectors vt, Vt, and wt denote average signals. We can then break
down the vector Wi
t of private signals in two di￿erent ways:13
(1) : W
i
t =
2
4 vi
t
Vi
t￿1
3
5 (2) : W
i
t =
2
4 Vi
t
wi
t
3
5 (9)
A crucial aspect of the analysis is that investors need to estimate future market
12A signal that is informative today may no longer be informative in the future. For example,
private information about a future dividend is no longer informative once that future dividend
is observed.
13The elements of the vector Wi
t are generally ordered di￿erently in these two breakdowns.
11expectations and thus information available in the future. We make two assump-
tions related to private information at t + 1.
Assumption 2 Idiosyncratic errors vi
t+1 ￿ vt+1 are orthogonal to previous infor-
mation: Ei
t(vi
t+1 ￿ vt+1jZt;Wi
t) = 0.
Assumption 3 Private signals wi
t that are no longer informative at t + 1 about
PVt+1 are also no longer informative at t + 1 about Vt+1.
Assumption 2 says that investors cannot predict idiosyncratic errors in their own
future private signals. Assumption 3 says that once private information is no longer
informative about future dividends it is also not informative about average private
signals that predict future dividends. Thus we can write : cov(wi
t;Vt+1jZt+1;Wi
t+1) =
0. Using these assumptions about the general information structure, we can now
be more precise about what determines the higher order wedge.
4.3 The Wedge as a First Order Expectational Error
Assumptions 1 and 3 imply that expectations at t + 1 about the present value of
future dividends and average private signals Vt+1 are a linear function of signals
Wi
t+1 and Zt+1. This function is the same for all investors. If we break down Wi
t+1
into Vi
t and vi
t+1, we can write
E
i
t+1PVt+1 = ￿
0
t+1V
i
t + ￿
0
t+1v
i
t+1 + ￿
0
t+1Zt+1 (10)
E
i
t+1Vt+1 = ￿
0
t+1V
i
t + ￿
0
t+1v
i
t+1 + ￿
0
t+1Zt+1 (11)
In the Appendix we then derive the following Proposition about the higher
order wedge.
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1 to 3, the deviation between higher and ￿rst
order expectations that a￿ects the equilibrium asset price is
￿t = ￿
0
t(EtVt ￿ Vt) (12)
where ￿t = 1
R2￿t+1 +
P1
s=2
1
Rs+1￿t+1:::￿t+s￿1￿t+s.
The proposition tells us that the higher order wedge depends on the average
expectational error at time t about the vector of average private signals. The
12proposition therefore reduces di￿erences between higher and ￿rst order expecta-
tions to a simple ￿rst order expectational error. In section 4.4 we discuss how the
combination of noisy public and private information implies average expectational
errors of the average private signals (EtVt ￿ Vt 6= 0). For now we take it as
given and provide intuition about how average expectational errors about average
private signals a￿ect the higher order wedge as in Proposition 1.
The vector ￿t multiplying EtVt ￿Vt is implied by the sum of ￿rst and higher
order expectations in (8). Consider the ￿rst element of ￿t, which corresponds to
the average expectation at t of the market expectational error at t+1 about PVt+1.
An investor’s expectation of this error can be written as Ei
t(Et+1PVt+1￿PVt+1) =
Ei
t(Et+1PVt+1 ￿ Ei
t+1PVt+1). From (10) it follows that:
Et+1PVt+1 ￿ E
i
t+1PVt+1 = ￿
0
t+1(Vt ￿ V
i
t) + ￿
0
t+1(vt+1 ￿ v
i
t+1) (13)
An investor expects the market to make expectational errors to the extent that
the market is expected to have a di￿erent set of private signals. It follows from
Assumption 2 that the second term in (13) is expected to be zero. An investor only
expects the market to make expectational errors tomorrow if he expects the average
private signals Vt today to be di￿erent from his own private signals. Taking the
expectation of (13) for investor i at time t yields ￿
0
t+1(Ei
tVt ￿Vi
t). The average of
this across investors is ￿
0
t+1(EtVt ￿Vt), which corresponds to the ￿rst element of
￿t.
The second element in ￿t corresponds to the sum of higher order expectations
of future expectational errors. Consider for example the second-order expectation
of the market’s expectational error at t + 2 about PVt+2. Corresponding to the
discussion above, the average expectation at t + 1 of the market’s expectational
error at t + 2 about PVt+2 is ￿
0
t+2(Et+1Vt+1 ￿ Vt+1). This depends itself on an
average expectational error, this time not about future dividends but about average
private signals. Using a similar argument as above, but using (11), the average
expectation at time t of the market’s expectational error at t + 1 about average
private signals is equal to ￿0
t+1(EtVt ￿ Vt). Following an iterative argument one
can similarly derive third and higher order expectations of future expectational
errors. The critical point is that these all depend on average expectational errors
at time t about average private signals.
One can think of ￿rst and higher order expectations of future expectational
13errors as resulting from a chain e￿ect. This explains why current expectational
mistakes EtVt￿Vt a￿ect expectations of all orders. As an illustration consider the
case where investors receive only one private signal vi
t at time t that is still relevant
at t + 1. Assume that a higher private signal vi
t at time t makes the investor both
more optimistic at t + 1 about future payo￿s (￿t+1 > 0) and more optimistic at
t + 1 about average private signals (￿t+1 > 0).
Now consider what happens when the average investor at time t expects others
to have more favorable, and therefore too optimistic, private signals, i.e., Etvt > vt.
The average investor then expects that (1) the market is too optimistic at t + 1
about future dividends and (2) the market is too optimistic at t+1 about average
private signals. The ￿rst leads to ￿rst order expectations of positive expectational
errors at t+1 about PVt+1. The second implies a ￿rst order expectation of positive
expectational errors at t + 1 about private signals, i.e., a ￿rst order expectation
at t that Et+1vt+1 > vt+1. This leads to the next step in the chain. Following the
same argument as above, it leads to second order expectations that the market is
too optimistic at t + 2 about future dividends and average private signals. The
latter leads to a third step in the chain, and so on.
4.4 On the Existence and Magnitude of the Higher Order
Wedge
With Proposition 1 as a starting point, we can derive the following two related
Propositions.
Proposition 2 Two necessary conditions for the existence of a higher order wedge
are: (i) public information is informative about average private signals, (ii) some
of the private information available at time t is still informative at t+1 in forming
expectations about future dividends.
Proposition 3 The higher order wedge depends on average expectational errors
about the average set of private signals based on public information, Et(WtjZt) ￿
Wt.
The ￿rst condition for the existence of the higher order wedge is that public
information is used to form expectations of average private signals. Since, from
14Assumption 1, private signals of all investors are drawn from the same distribution,
based on private information alone investors expect average private signals to be
the same as their own: Ei
t(WtjWi
t) = Wi
t. Averaging across investors it follows
that EtWt = Wt, and therefore also EtVt = Vt, when these expectations are
conditioned on private information only.
This is no longer the case once we introduce public information. When investors
have public information, the expectation of average private signals generally di￿ers
from their own private signals, so that Ei
tVt 6= Vi
t. For example, assume that
public information Zt is on average more favorable about Vt than the investors’
own private signals. Then a majority of investors will expect others to have more
favorable private information than their own, so that EtVt > Vt.
More generally, EtVt ￿Vt depends on expectational errors about average pri-
vate signals caused by public information. This can be seen as follows. From the
projection theorem for normally distributed variables, it follows that
E
i
tWt = Et(WtjZt) + cov(Wt;W
i
tjZt)(var(W
i
tjZt))
￿1(W
i
t ￿ Et(WtjZt)) (14)
Taking the average over all investors and subtracting Wt on each side, we have14
EtWt ￿ Wt = var(W
i
t ￿ WtjZt)(var(W
i
tjZt))
￿1(Et(WtjZt) ￿ Wt) (15)
Since average private signals Vt are a subset of Wt, it follows that the average
expectational error EtVt￿Vt depends on Et(WtjZt)￿Wt, which are the average
expectational errors about average private signals based on public information.
This leads to Proposition 3.
The second condition for the existence of the higher order wedge in Proposition
2 is that private information is still relevant the next period in forming expecta-
tions of future dividends. Investors will generally believe at time t that they have
di￿erent private information than others. But when private information at time t
is no longer relevant at t+1, investors have no reason to believe that their informa-
tion set at t + 1 di￿ers from others. Therefore they have no reason to expect that
the market will make expectational errors at t + 1. More formally, this condition
implies that ￿t+1 6= 0 in (10). It then follows from equation (13) and the discussion
14Here we use that cov(Wi
t￿ ￿ Wt; ￿ WtjZt) = 0 because private signals of all investors are drawn
from the same distribution.
15below it that investors at time t do not expect the market to make expectational
errors at t + 1.15
A fourth proposition provides insight about when the higher order expectation
wedge is largest.
Proposition 4 The variance of ￿t is largest for intermediate levels of the quality
of private information. It vanishes when the idiosyncratic noise in private signals
approaches zero or in￿nity.
The Appendix provides a formal proof. The idiosyncratic noise in private
signals approaches zero when var(Wi
t ￿ Wt) ! 0. It approaches in￿nity when
there is a series of normal distributions indexed by k such that in the limit, as
k ! 1, var(Wi
t ￿Wt) approaches k￿t with ￿t a matrix containing ￿nite values.
A brief intuitive description for Proposition 4 goes as follows. Private informa-
tion vanishes when either the idiosyncratic errors of private signals are in￿nitely
noisy or when the noise approaches zero. In the ￿rst case private information
becomes uninformative, while in the second case all investors receive the same sig-
nals, which are therefore no longer private. Investors know that all other investors
have the same information and there is no reason to expect other investors to make
expectational errors in the future.
5 The Disconnect between Asset Prices and Fu-
ture Dividends
So far we have discussed the determinants of the higher order wedge. We now turn
to the impact of the wedge on the equilibrium price. The main impact is that the
higher order wedge tends to weaken the relationship between the asset price and
the present value of future dividends. Although at this level of generality there is
no formal proof of this result, it holds more generally than in the speci￿c models
discussed in the next two sections. We also show that the wedge reduces the asset
price variance.
15Note that for a non-zero higher order wedge it is su￿cient that private information at t is
still relevant at t+1. Private information at time t does not need to be relevant at t+2 or later
in forming expectations about future dividends or average private signals.
16Making explicit the expectational error in the expected present value of divi-
dends, we can rewrite (7) as:
Pt = PVt + (EtPVt ￿ PVt) ￿ ￿t + ￿t (16)
Even in the absence of the higher order wedge the correlation between Pt and PVt
is generally reduced by expectational errors EtPVt￿PVt and the risk-premium ￿t.
First, since the risk premium is generated by supply shocks, it may be uncorrelated
with PVt. Second, the average expectational error EtPVt ￿ PVt is negatively
correlated with the present value of future dividends PVt.16
The higher order wedge further contributes to lower this correlation, because
in general it is also negatively correlated with PVt. One can write the covariance
between the higher order wedge and PVt as
cov(PVt;￿t) =
Z 1
0
cov(PVt;￿
0
t(E
i
tVt ￿ Vt))di =
￿
Z 1
0
cov(E
i
tPVt ￿ PVt;￿
0
t(E
i
tVt ￿ Vt))di (17)
While the wedge depends on expectational errors about average private signals,
these tend to be positively related to expectational errors about future dividends.
For example, favorable public information that causes investors to be too optimistic
about future dividends generally also causes them to be too optimistic about av-
erage private signals of those future dividends. Therefore cov(PVt;￿t) < 0 to
the extent that expectational errors about future dividends are positively related
to expectational errors about average private signals.17 The higher order wedge
therefore further weakens the relationship between the price and future dividends.
In the simple model of the next section average private signals Vt are equal
to a terminal dividend DT. With a zero interest rate, PVt is also equal to DT.
Therefore Vt = PVt. In that case, expectational errors about PVt and Vt are
perfectly correlated and the higher order wedge ampli￿es the impact on the asset
price of expectational errors about the future dividend.
16cov(EtPVt ￿ PVt;PVt) =
R 1
0 cov(Ei
tPVt ￿ PVt;PVt)di =
R 1
0 cov(Ei
tPVt ￿ PVt;PVt ￿
Ei
tPVt)di = ￿
R 1
0 var(Ei
tPVt ￿ PVt)di < 0.
17This implicitly assumes that the elements of ￿t are positive. Proposition 1 shows that this
is naturally the case. The elements of ￿t are positive to the extent that higher private signals
raise the expectation of PVt (￿ > 0) and raise the expectation of average private signals next
period (￿ > 0). In the models of section 6 and 7 the vector ￿t is always positive.
17The ￿nding that higher order expectations disconnect the price from future
dividends does not mean that they lead to more asset price volatility. On the
contrary, the higher order wedge reduces asset price volatility. De￿ne the asset
price without higher order expectations as P ￿
t = Pt ￿ ￿t which from (7) gives
P ￿
t = EtPVt ￿ ￿t. Then it is easy to show that var(Pt) < var(P ￿
t ), i.e., that the
price is less volatile than it would be if we eliminate the higher order wedge and
are left with the two standard asset price components (expected dividends and risk
premia). More precisely, var(Pt) = var(P ￿
t )￿var(￿t). This can be seen as follows.
Since the asset price Pt is in the information set of investors, expectational errors
at time t should be orthogonal to the price, so that cov(Pt;￿t) = 0. Therefore
var(P ￿
t ) = var(Pt ￿ ￿t) = var(Pt) + var(￿t). It also follows that cov(P ￿
t ;￿t) =
￿var(￿t). This negative correlation between the higher order wedge and the sum
of the standard asset price components reduces the variance of the price.
The ￿ndings that the higher order wedge both reduces asset price volatility and
disconnects the price from future dividends are not unrelated. As will be illustrated
in the two models below, the equilibrium price gives less weight to future dividends
due to the higher order wedge. This both disconnects the price from those future
dividends and reduces volatility.
In order to illustrate our general analysis and derive precise results about the
impact of the higher order wedge on the equilibrium price, we now turn to two
models with speci￿c information and payo￿ structures. The next section discusses
a model with a ￿nitely-lived asset with one payo￿. After that we analyze a model
with an in￿nitely-lived asset with continuous payo￿s.
6 A Model With a Finitely-Lived Asset
As mentioned in Section 2, the case of a ￿nitely-lived asset with only one terminal
payo￿ is well known in ￿nance and has already received some attention in the
discussion of higher order expectations in asset pricing. An advantage of this case
is that explicit analytical results are feasible. Moreover, we illustrate the main
analytical results numerically to show that the quantitative impact of the higher
order wedge can be large.
The world starts at date 1 and the asset yields a single dividend of DT at
date T. Assume that R = 1. Before trading starts at date 1 all investors receive
18a common signal D = DT + "d, where "d ￿ N(0;￿2
d). Investors also receive a
private signal vi = DT + "vi, with "vi ￿ N(0;￿2
v). The errors in private signals
average to zero across investors. It is assumed that investors receive no additional
\exogenous" signals subsequent to that, although they will learn from observing
the asset price each period.18 The asset supplies X1;::;XT￿1 are assumed to be
i.i.d. N(0;￿2
x) variables.19
Equation (4) simpli￿es to:
Pt = E
T￿t
t DT ￿ ￿￿
2
tXt (18)
The price depends on the expectation of order T ￿t of the terminal dividend. The
longer the remaining maturity, the higher the order of expectations. The analogue
of (7) is given by
Pt = EtDT ￿ ￿￿
2
tXt + ￿t (19)
where the higher order wedge ￿t is equal to
￿t = E
T￿t
t DT ￿ EtDT: (20)
This is the analogue to (5). In this model, the higher order wedge takes a very
simple form as the di￿erence between the T ￿ t order expectation and the ￿rst
order expectation of the terminal dividend.
We now focus on the asset price in period 1. Proposition 1 signi￿cantly simpli-
￿es in this case because V t = DT. Moreover, ￿t = ￿t, since PVt = DT. Proposition
1 therefore implies that the wedge is equal to
￿1 = ￿1(E1DT ￿ DT)
= (￿2 + ￿2￿3 + ￿2￿3￿3 + ::: + ￿2￿3:::￿T￿1)(E1DT ￿ DT) (21)
where ￿t is the weight given to the initial private signal in an investor’s date-t
expectation of the terminal dividend. Since these weights are positive, it follows
that ￿1 > 0.
Substitution of the higher order wedge (21) into the equilibrium price (19) for
t = 1 yields
P1 = DT + (1 + ￿1)(E1DT ￿ DT) ￿ ￿￿
2
tXt (22)
18It is straightforward to extend to the case where investors receive a new private signal each
period.
19Introducing a non-zero mean asset supply does not qualitatively change any results.
19This equation illustrates two implications of higher order expectations discussed
in the previous sections. First, the asset price can be written as a function of
the ￿rst order expectation of future dividends. This also extends the ￿nding of
He and Wang (1995) to the relevant dynamic higher order expectations. Second,
since ￿1 > 0 equation (22) shows that higher order expectations give more weight
to the expectational error about the terminal dividend. As explained in Section 5,
this is due to the perfect correlation of expectational errors about future dividends
with expectational errors about average private signals, which in this case are
both E1DT ￿ DT. The price will therefore be more disconnected from the future
dividend. We make this ￿nding more precise by explicitly solving for E1DT from a
signal extraction problem. In the Appendix we show that this leads to the following
Proposition.
Proposition 5 In the ￿nitely-lived asset case, the equilibrium period 1 asset price
depends on the supply shock, the terminal dividend and the common prior D.
Higher order expectations increase the impact of the supply shock and the common
prior, while reducing the impact of the terminal dividend. As a result, the corre-
lation between the terminal dividend and the price is reduced by the higher order
wedge.
Leaving details to the Appendix, we will sketch the main steps leading to this
Proposition. We ￿rst conjecture an equilibrium price
P1 = ￿1DT + ￿2D ￿ ￿3X1 ￿1 > 0; ￿2 > 0; ￿3 > 0: (23)
An investor’s estimate of the terminal dividend is then based on three sources of
information. In addition to the private signal, investors have two public signals: the
prior D and the ’adjusted’ asset price (P1 ￿￿2D)=￿1. Thus, the signal extraction
problem leads to a simple form of equation (10):
E
i
1DT = ￿1v
i + ￿1(P1 ￿ ￿2D)=￿1 + ￿2D (24)
where ￿1, ￿1, and ￿2 are positive scalars that sum to one. The parameters of the
equilibrium price equation can be found by substituting the average of (24) across
investors into (22) and equating the resulting equilibrium price equation to the
conjectured equation (23). The Appendix shows that, as expected, ￿1, ￿2 and ￿3
are positive.
20Substituting the equilibrium price (23) back into the average of (24) across
investors, we have (using ￿1 + ￿1 + ￿2 = 1):
E1DT ￿ DT = ￿2(D ￿ DT) ￿ ￿1
￿3
￿1
X1 (25)
Since ￿1 = ￿1(E1DT ￿ DT), the higher order wedge depends positively on errors
in the public signals: the error D ￿ DT = "d of the prior signal D and the error
￿(￿3=￿1)X1 of the price signal. This illustrates the more general result from
Proposition 3 that the higher order wedge depends on average expectational errors
about average private signals based on public information.
Because the impact of expectational errors on the equilibrium price are ampli-
￿ed by the higher order wedge, the errors in public signals D￿DT and ￿(￿3=￿1)X1
receive more weight in the price. This implies that the impact of the supply shock
X1 on the price is ampli￿ed, the weight on DT is reduced and the weight on D is
increased. This can be seen directly by substituting (25) into (22):
P1 = [1 ￿ ￿2(1 + ￿1)]DT + (1 + ￿1)￿2D ￿ [￿￿
2
1 + (1 + ￿1)￿1
￿3
￿1
]X1 (26)
where the role of higher order expectations is captured by the parameter ￿1 > 0.
By giving less weight to the future payo￿ and more weight to supply noise the
equilibrium asset price is less correlated with the payo￿.
Allen et. al. (2003) also study the role of higher order expectations in this
model. They do not explicitly consider the higher order wedge. Instead they
compare the equilibrium price Pt over time. The idea is that the order of the
expectation goes down as we get closer to the terminal date. They ￿nd that the
farther we are from the terminal date, the larger the coe￿cient on D and the
smaller coe￿cient on DT. One needs to be careful here since a change in the
equilibrium price function over time is a￿ected by both higher order expectations
and a change in the information set over time. Their result exclusively re￿ects the
role of higher order expectations in the case where the information set is constant
(no learning). This happens when the supply noise has in￿nite variance, so that the
price is not informative. By focusing on the higher order wedge we can investigate
the role of higher order expectations in the general case. We ￿nd that higher order
expectations indeed give more weight to D and less weight to DT, while in addition
the impact of the supply noise on the equilibrium price is ampli￿ed.
21Allen et. al. (2003) also emphasize that more weight is given to public infor-
mation as a result of higher order expectations. More precisely, we ￿nd that as a
result of higher order expectations more weight is given to errors in public signals.
While this result holds in the current example, we show in the next section that
it does not generalize to all types of public information.
Figure 1 illustrates the model’s properties for a given set of parameters. The
Appendix describes the numerical solution method adopted to simultaneously solve
for the equilibrium asset prices in all T periods. We consider a benchmark case
with ￿v = ￿d = ￿x = 0:4, ￿ = 6 and T = 8. In Panel A we show the correlation
between Pt and DT for 1 ￿ t ￿ 7 and compare it with the correlation between P ￿
t
(the price without the wedge) and DT. It shows that the impact of higher order
expectations can be very large. In period 1 the correlation between the terminal
dividend and the price is less than 0.1, while the correlation between the terminal
dividend and P ￿ is larger than 0.8. As we move closer to the terminal date, the
order of expectations goes down and the di￿erence in these correlations is reduced.
One period before the terminal date, at t = 7, the two correlations are equal since
there is no higher order expectation.
We should emphasize that panel A only illustrates that the impact of higher
order expectations can be very large for certain parameters. It is possible to pick a
di￿erent set of parameters where the impact is much smaller. In order to judge the
true quantitative impact of higher order expectations it is necessary to estimate or
calibrate an asset pricing model with more realistic assumptions about the payo￿
structure, information structure and preferences.
Panel B decomposes the variance of the price as t increases from 1 to 7. Since
var(Pt) = var(P ￿
t ) + var(￿t) + 2cov(P ￿
t ;￿t), we can decompose the variance of
the price into three components. They are each reported in panel B as a share
of the variance of the price itself. In period 1 both the variance of P ￿
t and the
variance of ￿t are larger than the variance of Pt, but these two elements have a
signi￿cant negative covariance. As time goes on the relative variance of the higher
order wedge gradually approaches zero.
Finally, Panel C illustrates Proposition 4. The panel shows how much the
higher order wedge reduces the correlation between P1 and DT in comparison to
the correlation between P ￿
1 and DT. It shows that the correlation between the price
and the terminal dividend is reduced the most for an intermediate quality of private
22signals. The peak is reached at ￿v = 1:1, where the di￿erence in correlations is close
to one. The correlation between the price and the terminal dividend is una￿ected
by the higher order wedge when the standard deviation of the noise in private
signals goes to zero or in￿nity.
7 An In￿nitely-lived Asset in Steady State
In the second model we consider, the asset pays dividends each period and has an
in￿nite life. In contrast to the previous model, the information structure is such
that the equilibrium price function is time invariant. This case has the advantage
that it ￿ts much better within the tradition of dynamic macroeconomic modeling
in which time invariant unconditional moments can be computed and compared to
the data. The in￿nite life of the asset does not deliver a time invariant equilibrium
by itself. Two other features delivering this are an in￿nite past and a continuous
information ￿ow of constant quality.
We now describe a very simple version of an in￿nitely-lived asset model. Even
though we keep the information structure quite simple, the model does not lend
itself to an analytical solution. We therefore solve for the equilibrium price nu-
merically. Although we ￿nd that the model exhibits some important di￿erences
in comparison to the ￿nite-life asset model, the key ￿nding that the higher order
wedge disconnects the asset price from the present value of future dividends is
upheld.
The asset yields a dividend Dt at each period t. For simplicity we assume that
dividends are i.i.d., so that:
Dt = D + "
d
t (27)
where "d
t ￿ N(0;￿2
d). The process of dividends is assumed to be common knowledge
so that D is a public signal. Moreover, each period investors obtain a private signal
about the dividend T periods later:
v
i
t = Dt+T + "
vi
t (28)
with "vi
t ￿ N(0;￿2
v). It is again assumed that errors in private signals average to
zero across investors. Asset supplies Xt are again assumed to be i.i.d. N(0;￿2
x)
variables. This completes the description of the \exogenous" pieces of informa-
23tion available to investors. Equilibrium prices are again an endogenous source of
information, to which we turn below.
As T increases investors get information further in advance but also have
a larger number of relevant private signals each period. Since Vi
t denotes the
private information set at time t that is still valuable at time t + 1, we have
Vi
t = fvi
t￿T+2;::;vi
tg and the average across agents is Vt = fDt+2;::;Dt+Tg for
T ￿ 2.20 Since expectations of PVt and Vt are a time-invariant function of
the information set in this model, it follows from Proposition 1 that the vector
￿ = 1
R2(I￿￿)￿1￿ is time invariant as well. We will write it as ￿0 = f￿1;::;￿T￿1g.
Proposition 1 then implies
￿t =
T X
s=2
￿s￿1(EtDt+s ￿ Dt+s) (29)
Numerical results show that all the elements of ￿ are positive. It is therefore again
the case that the higher order wedge depends positively on expectational errors
about future dividends and therefore magni￿es the impact of expectational errors
on the equilibrium price. This will again lower the correlation between the asset
price and future dividends.
As in the previous example, expectational errors of future dividends depend on
two types of public signal errors, associated with price signals and the signal D. To
compute the equilibrium price, we use the method of undetermined coe￿cients,
and assume the following equation (see the Appendix for a description of the
solution method):
Pt =
T X
s=1
asDt+s + aT+1D ￿
T X
s=1
bsXt￿s+1 as > 0; bs > 0: (30)
where
PT+1
s=1 as = 1=(R ￿ 1). The price is now a signal of a positive weighted
average of future dividends. The error in the price signal depends negatively
on a weighted average of current and past supply shocks. Even though supply
shocks are not persistent, they have a persistent e￿ect on the asset price since past
equilibrium prices (which depend on past supply shocks) are informative about
20When T = 1 private signals today are no longer in the information set tomorrow since
tomorrow’s dividend is observed tomorrow. In that case higher order expectations collapse to
￿rst order expectations.
24future dividends.21
Numerical analysis shows that it remains the case, as in the previous model,
that the higher order wedge ampli￿es the contribution of supply shocks to price
volatility, while reducing the contribution of future dividends to price volatility.
However, it is no longer the case that the higher order wedge reduces the weight
on all future dividends and ampli￿es coe￿cients on all current and past supply
shocks. The reason for this is that some public signals raise the expectation of the
present value of future dividends while lowering the expectation of average private
signals. To the extent that an error in a public signal raises EtPVt ￿ PVt but
lowers ￿0
t(EtVt ￿ Vt), the higher order wedge dampens the impact of the error
in the public signal on the equilibrium price. It also explains why the ￿nding by
Allen, Morris and Shin (2003) that higher order expectations give more weight to
public signals does not easily generalize to all public signals.
Consider for example the case of T = 2, where both Pt and Pt￿1 are part of the
public information set. It can be shown that a higher Pt￿1 raises the expectation
at time t of the present value of future dividends, but lowers the expectation of
the average private signal Vt = Dt+2.22 This leads to a reduced impact of Xt￿1
on Pt, because Pt￿1 is in￿uenced by Xt￿1. On the other hand, since a higher Pt
raises expectations of both the present value of future dividends and the average
private signal, the impact of Xt on the price is ampli￿ed. Numerically the overall
contribution of supply shocks is still ampli￿ed, because the smaller weight on Xt￿1
is dominated by the larger weight on Xt.23
In order to provide an illustration, Figure 2 shows some results for the pa-
21Supply shocks at t￿T and earlier are common knowledge at date t since they can be extracted
from equilibrium prices at t ￿ T and earlier.
22Since it depends positively on the dividend at t+1, a higher Pt￿1 raises the expected dividend
at t + 1. However, Pt depends positively on dividends at both t + 1 and t + 2. Thus, for a given
price Pt, the expectation of the dividend at t + 2 is lower the higher the expectation of the
dividend at t + 1.
23For the case of T = 2 we also ￿nd that the weight on Dt+1 is ampli￿ed, while the weight on
Dt+2 is reduced. The increased weight on Dt+1 has a similar explanation as the reduced weight
on Xt￿1. To see this it is useful to add the corresponding time index to the prior of a future
dividend, e.g., Dt+1 is the prior Dt+1. Similar to Pt￿1 this public signal raises the expectation
of the present value of dividends while lowering the expectation of the average private signal.
This leads to a reduced impact on the price of the error Dt+1 ￿ Dt+1 in the public signal, and
therefore a higher weight of Dt+1.
25rameterization ￿v = ￿d = ￿x = 0:4, R = 1:02, ￿ = 2. In panels A and B the
parameter T is varied from 2 to 50. We should warn not to compare those panels
to the corresponding ones from the previous example. In Figure 1 we report how
moments vary over time for a given parameterization, while in Figure 2 we report
time-independent moments for di￿erent parameters T that a￿ect the information
structure. Panel A again shows the drop in the correlation between the price and
the present value of future dividends as a result of the higher order wedge. The
change rises for larger values of T. When T is small, the information about most
future dividends is public (in the form of the prior D), so that higher order ex-
pectations have little impact. The example shows that for T = 50 the impact
of higher order expectations is substantial, reducing the correlation between the
present discounted value of dividends and the price from 0.82 to 0.29.
Consistent with Panel A, Panel B shows that the variance of the higher order
wedge rises relative to the variance of the price when T increases. The same is
the case for P ￿. When T = 50 the variance of the higher order wedge is larger
than the variance of P, while the variance of P ￿ is more than twice the variance of
P. The remaining factor contributing to the variance of the price is again a large
negative covariance between the higher order wedge and P ￿.
Panel C illustrates Proposition 4 for T = 30. As in the previous example we
see that the impact of the higher order wedge on the correlation between the price
and the present value of dividends is maximized for an intermediate level of the
quality of private information. The reduction in the correlation is largest (0.51)
for ￿v = 0:7. The impact on the correlation vanishes to zero when either ￿v ! 1
or ￿v ! 0.
8 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the role of higher order expectations for asset pricing. We
have shown that higher order expectations generally di￿er from ￿rst order expec-
tations, and that this di￿erence can have strong implications for the equilibrium
asset price. The paper has devoted signi￿cant attention towards understanding
what determines this new asset pricing determinant, which we called the \higher
order wedge," and how it a￿ects the equilibrium price. A key result is that it
weakens the relationship between the price and future dividends.
26While our analysis assumes full rationality of investors, the recent literature in
behavioral ￿nance implies that expectational errors could be caused by deviations
from rationality, such as overcon￿dence or changing market mood. We conjecture
that the insights from our general analysis also apply when expectational errors
are caused by factors di￿erent from noisy public signals. In particular, the im-
pact of these errors would be ampli￿ed by higher order expectations. Combining
the dimension of market psychology with our analysis of higher order expectations
would bring us close to Keynes’ reasoning on asset prices and closer to understand-
ing asset price movements.
Another natural direction for future research is to quantify the importance of
the higher order wedge as an asset pricing determinant. While we have shown
that it can be quantitatively very large, its magnitude needs to be evaluated in
the context of a somewhat more realistic setup that is calibrated to actual data.
In particular, we have maintained the standard assumption in noisy rational ex-
pectations models of constant absolute risk aversion. While this simpli￿es the
solution signi￿cantly, a more realistic constant rate of relative risk aversion needs
to be adopted when confronting the model to the data. More realistic assumptions
about the process of dividends and the information structure would need to be
considered as well.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Using Assumption 2, the investor’s expectation of (13) is:
E
i
t(Et+1PVt+1 ￿ E
i
t+1PVt+1) = ￿
0
t+1(E
i
t(Vt) ￿ V
i
t) (31)
so that average expectation at time t of the expected average expectational error
at t + 1 is:
Et(Et+1PVt+1 ￿ PVt+1) = ￿
0
t+1(EtVt ￿ Vt) (32)
The other terms in (8) involve higher order expectations of future expectational
errors. Consider the deviation at t+s: E
s
t(Et+sPVt+s￿PVt+s). It can be rewritten
as E
s￿1
t Et+s￿1(Et+sPVt+s ￿ PVt+s). Using (32) at time t + s ￿ 1 we can write:
E
s
t(Et+sPVt+s ￿ PVt+s) = ￿
0
t+sE
s￿1
t (Et+s￿1Vt+s￿1 ￿ Vt+s￿1) (33)
This implies that investors at time t need to compute higher order expectations
of information available to investors at time t + s ￿ 1.
Using (11) and following the same reasoning as to get (32), it then follows that
Et(Et+1Vt+1 ￿ Vt+1) = ￿
0
t+1(EtVt ￿ Vt)
Similarly Et+s￿2(Et+s￿1Vt+s￿1￿Vt+s￿1) = ￿0
t+s￿1(Et+s￿2Vt+s￿2￿Vt+s￿2). This
can be substituted into (33) and we can work backwards using (11) to get
E
s
t(Et+sPVt+s ￿ PVt+s) = ￿
0
t+s￿1￿
0
t+s￿1:::￿
0
t+1(EtVt ￿ Vt) (34)
Doing this for all s and adding it to (32) gives ￿t in Proposition 1.
B Proof of Proposition 4
De￿ne mt = cov(Wt;PVtjZt), ￿t = var(WtjZt) and ￿t = var(Wi
t￿Wt). Let At
and Bt be matrices of zeros and ones such that Vt = AtWt and Vt￿1 = BtWt. It
then follows from Proposition 1 and (15) that
￿t = ￿
0
tAt￿t(￿t + ￿t)
￿1(Et(WtjZt) ￿ Wt) (35)
28Therefore
var(￿t) = ￿
0
tAt￿t(￿t + ￿t)
￿1￿t(￿t + ￿t)
￿1￿tA
0
t￿t (36)
The vector ￿t depends on ￿t+s and ￿t+s, s = 1;2;::. From the projection the-
orem @Ei
t+sPVt+s=@Wi
t+s = m0
t+s(￿t+s + ￿t+s)￿1. Thus ￿t+s = Bt+s(￿t+s +
￿t+s)￿1mt+s. Similarly, from the projection theorem @Ei
t+s ￿ Wt+s=@Wi
t+s = ￿t+s(￿t+s+
￿t+s)￿1. Therefore ￿t+s = Bt+s(￿t+s + ￿t+s)￿1￿t+sA0
t+s.
First consider the case where the idiosyncratic noise in private signals ap-
proaches zero, so that ￿t ! 0 for all t. All other matrices are una￿ected. It
follows that ￿t+s ! Bt+s￿
￿1
t+smt+s and ￿t+s ! Bt+sA0
t+s, so that ￿t approaches
some vector of ￿nite values. From (36) it immediately follows that var(￿t) ! 0
since the expression A￿t(￿t + ￿t)￿1￿t(￿t + ￿t)￿1￿tA0 approaches zero.
Next consider the case where the idiosyncratic errors in private signals become
in￿nitely noisy. More precisely, for all t ￿t ! k￿t with k ! 1 and ￿t a matrix
with ￿nite values. It follows that ￿t+s ! 0 and ￿t+s ! 0, so that ￿t ! 0.
The expression At￿t(￿t+￿t)￿1￿t(￿t+￿t)￿1￿tA0
t in (36) approaches the matrix
At￿tA0
t, which has ￿nite values. Therefore var(￿t) ! 0. This completes the
proof of Proposition 4.
C Finitely-lived Asset
In this section we solve the model of Section 6 and prove Proposition 5.
C.1 Model Solution
First, we can use (2) to write the asset price at each period:
Pt = Et(Pt+1) ￿ ￿￿
2
tXt t < T ￿ 1 (37)
PT￿1 = ET￿1(DT) ￿ ￿￿
2
T￿1XT￿1 (38)
where ￿2
t = vart(Pt+1). We now conjecture equilibrium prices for 1 ￿ t < T:
P1 = a1DT + b1D + c11X1
P2 = a2DT + b2D + c21X1 + c22X2 (39)
:::
PT￿1 = aT￿1DT + bT￿1D + cT￿1;1X1 + cT￿1;2X2 + ::: + cT￿1;T￿1XT￿1
29Besides the prior D, the information available to investors at time t consists
of prices and the private signal. It is useful to de￿ne the adjusted price signals as
e Pt ￿ Pt ￿ btD (as a signal of atDT). De￿ne the vector of unobservables as Kt =
(DT;X1;X2;:::;Xt)0. Based on prior information this has a normal distribution
with mean K = (D;0;:::;0)0 and variance
￿KK;t =
2
6
6
6 6
6
6
4
￿2
d 0 ::: 0
0 ￿2
x ::: 0
. . .
. . . ... . . .
0 0 ::: ￿2
x
3
7
7
7 7
7
7
5
Now consider updating the expectation and variance of Kt based on the vector
of observables Y i
t = ( e P1; e P2;:::; e Pt;vi)0. Using (39) we can write:
Y
i
t = CtKt + s
i
t (40)
where si
t = (0;:::;0;"vi)0 and
Ct =
2
6
6 6
6
6 6
6
6 6
4
a1 c11 0 ::: 0
a2 c21 c22 ::: 0
. . .
. . .
. . . ... . . .
at ct1 ct2 ::: ctt
1 0 0 ::: 0
3
7
7 7
7
7 7
7 7
7
5
￿ss;t = var(s
i
t) =
2
6
6
6 6
6
6
4
0 0 ::: 0
0 0 ::: 0
. . .
. . . ... . . .
0 0 ::: ￿2
v
3
7
7
7 7
7
7
5
Applying the projection theorem, we get:
E
i
tKt = K + ￿KK;tC
0
t(Ct￿KK;tC
0
t + ￿ss;t)
￿1(Y
i
t ￿ CtK) (41)
￿ (I ￿ MtCt)K + MtY
i
t
vart(Kt) = ￿KK;t ￿ ￿KK;tC
0
t(Ct￿KK;tC
0
t + ￿ss;t)
￿1Ct￿
0
KK;t
We can now consider Pt+1 and take its expectation. The conjecture for Pt+1 is:
Pt+1 = at+1DT + bt+1D + ct+1;1X1 + ct+1;2X2 + ::: + ct+1;t+1Xt+1 (42)
which can be rewritten as:
Pt+1 = bt+1D + A
0
t+1Kt + ct+1;t+1Xt+1
30where A0
t+1 = (at+1;ct+1;1;:::;ct+1;t). Using (41), we can write:
E
i
t(Pt+1) = bt+1D + A
0
t+1MtY
i
t
where bt+1 is bt+1 plus A0
t+1 times the ￿rst column of (I ￿MtCt). Aggregating over
investors, using (40) and the fact that si
t averages to zero, we have:
Et(Pt+1) = bt+1D + A
0
t+1MtCtKt
The variance is given by:
￿
2
t = vart(Pt+1) = A
0
t+1vart(Kt)At+1 + c
2
t+1;t+1￿
2
x
The expectation of Pt+1 can be substituted into (37) so that for t < T ￿ 1:
Pt = ￿ bt+1D + A
0
t+1MtCtKt ￿ ￿￿
2
tXt ￿ (43)
e atDT + e btD + e ct;1X1 + e ct;2X2 + ::: + e ct;tXt
This equation has the same form as the conjectured equation (39) for 1 ￿ t < T￿1.
For t = T ￿ 1 we can derive a similar equation from (41), using that ET￿1(DT)
is equal to the ￿rst element of Ei
T￿1KT￿1. This again yields an equilibrium price
equation that has the same form as the conjectured price equation. All that
remains is to equate the coe￿cients of the equilibrium price equations to the co-
e￿cients of the conjectured price equations. This involves solving a ￿xed point
problem for a set of non-linear equations, which is done numerically.
C.2 Proposition 5
Section 6 focuses on the price at t = 1. In this case we have Y i
1 = ( e P1;vi)0 and
K1 = (DT;X1)0 with the matrices:
C1 =
2
4 a1 c11
1 0
3
5 ￿KK;1 =
2
4 ￿2
d 0
0 ￿2
x
3
5 ￿ss;1 =
2
4 0 0
0 ￿2
v
3
5
This implies that:
M1 =
1
S
2
4 m11 m12
m21 m22
3
5
31with m11 = a1￿2
d￿2
v, m12 = c2
11￿2
x￿2
d, m21 = c11￿2
x(￿2
d + ￿2
v);m22 = ￿a1c11￿2
x￿2
d; and
S = a2
1￿2
d￿2
v + c2
11￿2
x￿2
d + c2
11￿2
x￿2
v.
Using (41), we ￿nd:
E1DT = (1 ￿
a1m11 + m12
S
)D +
1
S
(m11 e P1 + m12DT)
which can be rewritten as:
E1DT =
1
￿2
d
D + 1
￿2
vDT + a1
c2
11
1
￿2
x
e P1
1
￿2
d
+ 1
￿2
v +
￿
a1
c11
￿2 1
￿2
x
(44)
which leads to (24), with ￿1, ￿1 and ￿2 the coe￿cients on respectively ￿ D, DT and
~ P1=a1. The expectation in (44) can be substituted into (22):
P1 = (1 + ￿1)
￿
￿1DT +
￿1
a1
(P1 ￿ b1D) + ￿2D
￿
￿ ￿1DT ￿ ￿￿
2
1Xt
so that:
￿
1 ￿ (1 + ￿1)
￿1
a1
￿
P1 = [(1 + ￿1)￿1 ￿ ￿1]DT +(1+￿1)
"
￿2 ￿
￿1b1
a1
#
D￿￿￿
2
1Xt (45)
To determine the sign of a1;b1; and c11, we use the fact that ￿1 < ￿1
1￿￿1. This
inequality holds for the following reason. Let Zt = ( ￿ D; e P1; e P2;:::; e Pt)0 be the set of
public information. Since this set of public information only expands over time it
follows that var(DTjZt) ￿ var(DTjZ1). Using the projection theorem, it follows
that when adding the private signal vi to this public information set, the coe￿cient
on vi in the expectation of DT is equal to ￿t = var(DTjZt)=(var(DTjZt) + ￿2
v). It
follows that ￿t ￿ ￿1 and therefore ￿1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2
1 + ::: + ￿
T￿2
1 < ￿1
1￿￿1 since the latter
term is the limit for the in￿nite series ￿n
1.
Using the conjectured price equation (23), the notation ￿1 ￿ a1;￿2 ￿ b1,
￿3 ￿ c11, and ￿1 < ￿1
1￿￿1, from (45) we have:
￿1 =
(1 + ￿1)￿1 ￿ ￿1
1 ￿ (1 + ￿1)
￿1
￿1
> 0 ! ￿1 = (1 + ￿1)(￿1 + ￿1) ￿ ￿1 > 0
￿2 =
(1 + ￿1)(￿2 ￿
￿1￿2
￿1 )
1 ￿ (1 + ￿1)
￿1
￿1
> 0 ! ￿2 = ￿2(1 + ￿1) > 0
￿3 =
￿￿2
1
1 ￿ (1 + ￿1)
￿1
￿1
=
 
1 +
(1 + ￿1)￿1
(1 + ￿1)￿1 ￿ ￿1
!
￿￿
2
1 > 0
It can be easily seen that ￿1 > 0 lowers ￿1, while raising ￿2 and ￿3. The rest
of the proof of Proposition 5 follows from the discussion in Section 5.
32D In￿nitely-Lived Asset
Without going into great detail we provide a brief overview of the solution method
for the model in section 7 of the paper. The starting point for the solution is
equation (2) and the conjectured price equation (23):
Pt =
T X
s=1
asDt+s + aT+1D ￿
T X
s=1
bsXt￿s+1 as > 0; bs > 0:
The vector of unknowns in this case is Kt = (Dt+1;::;Dt+T;Xt￿T+1;:::;Xt)0. At
time t investors know supply shocks at t￿T and earlier from the equilibrium prices
at t ￿ T and earlier. Prices from t ￿ T + 1 to t are informative about the vector
Kt of unknowns. It is useful to de￿ne adjusted prices as ~ Pt￿s = Pt￿s ￿ aT+1D ￿
Ps￿1
k=0 bT￿s+1+kXt￿T￿k, which at time t are observables for s ￿ 0.
As in the case of the ￿nitely-lived asset case, we update the distribution of
Kt based on prior information with a vector of observables, which now is Y i
t =
( ~ Pt￿T+1;::; ~ Pt;vi
t￿T+1;::;vi
t)0. We again use the fact that Y i
t can be written as CKt+
si
t, where now si
t = (0::0;￿vi
t￿T+1;::;￿vi
t )0. Applying the projection theorem, and
averaging over investors, EtKt = (I ￿MC)K +MCKt, where K = (D;::;D;0::0)0
is the expectation of Kt based on prior information and M is the same matrix as in
Appendix C. The variance of Kt also takes the same form as in Appendix C. Using
the conjectured price equation, we can then compute the average expectation of
Pt+1 + Dt+1 as a function of K and Kt, as well as the variance of Pt+1 + Dt+1
(which is ￿2). Substituting this into (2) and using the de￿nition of ￿t we obtain
the equilibrium period-t price as a function of K and Kt, which therefore takes
the same form as the conjectured price equation. All that remains to be done is to
equate the conjectured parameters to the equilibrium parameters. This non-linear
￿xed point problem is solved numerically.
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The University of Geneva 
The University of Geneva, originally known as the Academy of Geneva, was founded in 1559 by Jean 
Calvin and Theodore de Beze.  In 1873, The Academy of Geneva became the University of Geneva with the 
creation of a medical school.  The Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences was created in 1915.  The 
university is now composed of seven faculties of science; medicine; arts; law; economic and social sciences; 
psychology; education, and theology.  It also includes a school of translation and interpretation; an institute 
of architecture; seven interdisciplinary centers and six associated institutes. 
 
More than 13’000 students, the majority being foreigners, are enrolled in the various programs from the 
licence to high-level doctorates. A staff of more than 2’500 persons (professors, lecturers and assistants) is 
dedicated to the transmission and advancement of scientific knowledge through teaching as well as 
fundamental and applied research. The University of Geneva has been able to preserve the ancient European 
tradition of an academic community located in the heart of the city. This favors not only interaction between 
students, but also their integration in the population and in their participation of the particularly rich artistic 
and cultural life. http://www.unige.ch 
 
The University of Lausanne 
Founded as an academy in 1537, the University of Lausanne (UNIL) is a modern institution of higher 
education and advanced research.  Together with the neighboring Federal Polytechnic Institute of Lausanne, 
it comprises vast facilities and extends its influence beyond the city and the canton into regional, national, 
and international spheres. 
 
Lausanne is a comprehensive university composed of seven Schools and Faculties: religious studies; law; 
arts; social and political sciences; business; science and medicine. With its 9’000 students, it is a medium-
sized institution able to foster contact between students and professors as well as to encourage 
interdisciplinary work. The five humanities faculties and the science faculty are situated on the shores of 
Lake Leman in the Dorigny plains, a magnificent area of forest and fields that may have inspired the 
landscape depicted in Brueghel the Elder's masterpiece, the Harvesters.  The institutes and various centers of 
the School of Medicine are grouped around the hospitals in the center of Lausanne. The Institute of 
Biochemistry is located in Epalinges, in the northern hills overlooking the city. http://www.unil.ch 
 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies is a teaching and research institution devoted to the study of 
international relations at the graduate level. It was founded in 1927 by Professor William Rappard to 
contribute through scholarships to the experience of international co-operation which the establishment of 
the League of Nations in Geneva represented at that time. The Institute is a self-governing foundation 
closely connected with, but independent of, the University of Geneva. 
 
The Institute attempts to be both international and pluridisciplinary. The subjects in its curriculum, the 
composition of its teaching staff and the diversity of origin of its student body, confer upon it its 
international character.  Professors teaching at the Institute come from all regions of the world, and the 
approximately 650 students arrive from some 60 different countries. Its international character is further 
emphasized by the use of both English and French as working languages. Its pluralistic approach - which 
draws upon the methods of  economics, history, law, and political science - reflects its aim to provide a 
broad approach and in-depth understanding of international relations in general. http://heiwww.unige.ch 
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